CVE-2026-70630
Published: August 6th, 2026
FFmpeg versions from 3.0 up to, but not including, 9.0 contain an uninitialized heap memory read vulnerability in the native Screenpresso decoder (libavcodec/screenpresso.c) that allows attackers to recover sensitive memory contents by supplying a crafted SPV1 packet with a valid zlib stream that decompresses fewer bytes than the full frame requires. The screenpresso_decode_frame() function fails to validate the produced byte count before calling av_image_copy_plane() to copy the complete frame dimensions from the persistent ctx->inflated_buf buffer, causing unwritten heap memory from prior allocations or prior frames to be copied into decoded output and potentially exposing sensitive data such as userspace addresses from persistent decoding services.
MEDIUM
CVSS v3: 5.5
CVSS v3: 5.5
Status
| DocFilters Release | Package | State | Justification | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 26.3 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 26.2 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 26.1 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 25.4 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 25.3 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 25.2 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 25.1 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 24.4 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 24.4.0 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 24.3 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 24.2 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 24.1 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 23.3 | zlib (1.3) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 23.2 | zlib (1.2.12) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 23.1 | zlib (1.2.12) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 22.4 | zlib (1.2.12) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 22.3 | zlib (1.2.12) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 22.2 | zlib (1.2.12) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 22.1 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 21.11 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 21.8 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 21.5.0 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 21.2.0 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.19.3667 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.18.3599 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.16.3445 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.15.3368 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.14.3263 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.13.3179 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.12.3054 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.11.3040 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.11.2990 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.10.2934 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.9.2878 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
| 11.4.8.2822 | zlib (1.2.11) | Not Affected | Code Not Present | The vulnerable code is FFmpeg’s own Screenpresso SPV1 video decoder (screenpresso_decode_frame() in libavcodec/screenpresso.c), which ignores the actual output length returned by zlib’s uncompress() and hands the full frame geometry to av_image_copy_plane() out of a partially-initialized persistent heap buffer – the defect is in FFmpeg’s application-level handling of zlib’s result, not in zlib itself, and the upstream fix touches only libavcodec/screenpresso.c with no change to any zlib source file. Document Filters does not vendor, build, or link FFmpeg/libavcodec/libavformat in any form and implements no video codec of any kind; no FFmpeg, screenpresso, SPV1, inflated_buf, or av_image_copy_plane reference exists anywhere in this codebase, so the vulnerable code is never compiled in. Document Filters does identify and read AVI containers (ISYS_NS::ID::avi_video, filters/isysreaders/readers/ReaderAVI.cpp), but CAVIReader::LoadDocument() is a metadata-only RIFF header parser: it walks the ‘hdrl’/’strl’ header lists to emit stream, frame-rate, resolution, and audio-format metadata, then returns without reading the ‘movi’ chunk at all (‘Ignore the rest of the file, including any idxl’). It never inspects a stream’s fccHandler to dispatch a codec, never allocates a frame buffer, and never invokes zlib on packet payloads, so a crafted SPV1 packet carrying a short deflate stream is never decompressed or copied by Document Filters. |
Severity score breakdown
Attack Complexity
LOW
Attack Vector
LOCAL
Availability Impact
NONE
Base Score
5.5
Base Severity
MEDIUM
Confidentiality Impact
HIGH
Integrity Impact
NONE
Privileges Required
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
User Interaction
REQUIRED
Vector String
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Version
3.1